Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., a
Foreign Corporation, Ralph Pahnke and John Does
1 through 25 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James E. Morton; Ronald C. Wolthius; Morton, Skeen & Rasmussen; Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Joseph J. Palmer; Reid E. Lewis; Moyle & Draper; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., No. 920228 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4158

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UT*LH CT

• irixHi>v

ir
c
u
DOCKET NO. J — — — — — —

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., a
Foreign Corporation, RALPH
PAHNKE and JOHN DOES 1 through
25,

Case No. 920228-CA

Priority 16

Defendants - Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Joseph J. Palmer #2505
Reid E. Lewis #1951
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
15 E. 100 S.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-0250
Attorneys for Defendants Appellees

James E. Morton, #A3739
Ronald C. Wolthuis, #4699
MORTON, SKEEN & RASMUSSEN
1245 Brickyard Rd., #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 484-3000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant

FILE
QUN 21992
Mr

cs

»nan
ourt

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., a
Foreign Corporation, RALPH
PAHNKE and JOHN DOES 1 through
25,

Case No. 920228-CA

Priority 16

Defendants - Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Joseph J. Palmer #2505
Reid E. Lewis #1951
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
15 E. 100 S.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-0250
Attorneys for Defendants Appellees

James E. Morton, #A3739
Ronald C. Wolthuis, #4699
MORTON, SKEEN & RASMUSSEN
1245 Brickyard Rd., #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 484-3000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

I.

Anna Lee Is A Party To The Original
Action And May Appeal The Dismissal
Of Her Original Complaint

6

A. A Final Order or Judgment is
Appealable.

6

B. Even If Anna Lee Lost Her
Standing As a Party By Amending
Her Complaint, She Is The Real
Party In Interest And As Such Is
Entitled To Appeal The Dismissal
of Her Complaint.

10

1.

Non-parties may bring an
appeal in certain situations.

12

Anna Leefs Complaint Comes Within An
Exception To The General Rule That
Only The Trustee Can Bring The
Present Action.

14

II.

A. Anna Lee Pled, With Specificity,
An Exception To The General Rule That
Only A Trustee May Sue on Behalf Of
the the Trust.

14

B. The Trustee's Breach Was Not
Raised For The First Time On Appeal.

14

C. The Statute of Limitations Does
Not Bar Plaintiff's Claims.

15

CONCLUSION

17

2

I.
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Page
DiPascfuale Construction Corp. v. Zinnert, 539 A.2d
618, 619 (Conn.App. 1988).

7,

Estate of Tomlinson, 65 111.2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109
(1976)

13

Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983)

10,

Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451
(Utah 1985)

10

Miller v. Clark. 144 Colo. 431, 356 P.2d 965 (1960)

13

Montana Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Serv. Reg.. 709
P.2d 995 (Mont. 1985)

13

Olson v. Salt Lake City School District. 724 P.2d
960 (Utah 1986)

12

Roberts-Henry v. Richter. 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo. Ct.
App.1990)

13

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton. 600 P.2d 538 (Utah
1979)

6

Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743
P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987)

12

Teamsters et al v. Motor Cargo. 530, P.2d 807
(Utah 1974)

7

3

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Page
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §327 (1976)

15, 16

IV A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 327.2 at
326 (4th Ed. 1989)

17

4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal And Error § 176 (1962)

12

4

II.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this case, the original plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson is
the beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust.

Her son, James

Anderson was the trustee of the trust. In direct violation of the
terms of the trust, James transferred the bulk of the trust assets
(stocks)

to

his

own

personal

account

which

Defendants Ralph Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds.

was managed

by

Pahnke was the

account executive for not only James1 personal account, but also
for the trust's account.

Both Pahnke and Dean Witter had been

provided copies of the Norman Anderson Trust and were familiar with
the

limitations

and conditions therein.

In

spite of their

knowledge of the impropriety of the transfer of stock from the
Norman Anderson Trust account into James1 personal account, Pahnke
and Dean Witter authorized the transfer and participated in the
same receiving commissions therefrom.
Anna Lee was unaware of this transfer and that it was in
violation of the Norman Anderson Trust. Immediately upon learning
of the violation, Anna Lee filed this action against defendants in
December, 1990.

Anna Lee the proper party plaintiff because the

trustee, her son, had neglected to bring such an action.

It is

clear that a beneficiary may bring an action against a third party
who participates in a breach of trust by the trustee. Even if the
Court were to find that Anna Lee

was no longer a party after the

filing of the Amended Complaint, she would still have standing to
5

appeal because she is the real party in interest.

Further, there

is no more appropriate Appellant to file this appeal. Anna Lee was
privy to the action and was aggrieved by the Court's ruling.
A review of the Record and transcripts of the hearing on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint reveals that
Anna Lee has claimed from the beginning that the trustee, her son,
breached his fiduciary duty to the trust.
III.
ARGUMENT
I.

ANNA LEE IS A PARTY TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION AND MAY APPEAL
THE DISMISSAL OF HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT.
A.

A Final Order or Judgment is Appealable.

Anna Lee's original Complaint was formally dismissed by a
signed final Order.

See, Rec. 214 - 215.

Under Utah law, an

appeal can only be taken from a final order or judgment that has
been signed by the Court. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d
538, 539 (Utah 1979).
In the present case, Anna Lee's original Complaint was
formally dismissed by a signed written order dated September 16,
1991.

The order was a final order concluding Anna Lee's action

against Defendants. Therefore, having appealed from a final order
of the Court, Anna Lee is properly before this Court as an
appellant and may appeal the dismissal of her Complaint.
Defendants contend that Anna Lee is no longer a party to this
action and therefore lacks standing to appeal the dismissal of her
Complaint.

However, the case law Defendants rely upon to support

their contention is distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts
6

of the instant case. Defendants rely upon Teamsters et al v. Motor
Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (Utah 1974) and DiPasouale Construction Corp.
v. Zinnert, 539 A. 2d 618 (Conn.App. 1988) to support the propostion
that Anna Lee is prohibited from filing an appeal in this matter.
In Teamsters, the Utah Supreme Court held that the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") between a union
and its employers could not be considered absent the introduction
of the Agreement into evidence or attachment of or reference to the
Agreement in the Complaint.

530 P. 2d at 809. The Agreement had

been attached to the original Complaint.

However, the Complaint

was

failed

subsequently

amended.

Plaintiffs

to attach the

Agreement to the Amended Complaint or make reference to the
Agreement or the original Complaint. Nevertheless, the trial court
considered the Agreement in deciding the case even though it had
not been admitted into evidence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the Agreement
was not properly before the trial court because

it was not

introduced into evidence or appended to the Amended Complaint.
Further, the Court held that "since the original Complaint has no
function [in the present action due to the fact that it has been
amended], there was no evidence [of the Agreement] in the record
which would enable the [trial] court to rule as it did." Id., at
809.
Teamsters,however, clearly does not apply to the present
case.

The Court in Teamsters did not dismiss the original

Complaint and the issue was not whether the appeal was properly
7

before the Court as in the present case, but rather, whether the
trial Court erred in considering the agreement which was not in
evidence. The Teamsters holding is limited to the proposition that
evidentiary information contained in the original Complaint, but
left out of the Amended Complaint and not introduced into evidence,
cannot be the basis of the Court's decision. This proposition has
no application to the present action.
In the present case, Anna Lee is not attempting to bring
evidence contained in her original Complaint before the Court as a
basis for the Court's determination of the Amended Complaint. Both
Complaints were formally dismissed by the Court by signed written
orders. Anna lee now seeks only to appeal the formal dismissal of
her action pursuant to those orders.
In DiPasguale, Defendants filed an Answer and a two count
Counterclaim. The trial court struck one count of the Counterclaim
and subsequently granted Plaintiff's Motion for Default and nonsuit
brought pursuant to the Connecticut Rule of Practice because
Defendants failed to plead over after the Motion to Strike was
granted.

The Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a party is

not required to "file a substitute pleading when less than the
entire pleading has been stricken."

DiPasguale at 619.

The

Connecticut Appellate Court further stated that when a Motion to
Strike an entire pleading is granted by the Court, the losing party
"may

amend

his pleadings, or he may

stand

on his

original

pleadings, allow judgment to be rendered and appeal." Further, the
DiPasguale court stated that the filing of an amended pleading is
8

a withdrawal of the original. The ruling in DiPascpiale is clearly
limited to the facts of that case and the peculiarities of the
Connecticut Rules of Practice.
In the present case, Defendants contend that because Anna Lee
filed an Amended Complaint in an effort to resurrect her case, she
is now somehow precluded from appealing the dismissal of her
original Complaint.

However, Defendants have overlooked the fact

that the trial court in the present action executed a formal signed
written order dismissing Anna Lee's original Complaint. The order
dismissing Anna Lee's original Complaint was not even executed by
the Court until after she had filed her Amended Complaint, the
Defendants had filed their Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint,
and

the

Court

had

heard

oral

argument

and

already

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

granted

Obviously,

filing of the Amended Complaint did not prevent the Court from
formally dismissing Anna Lee's original Complaint after the fact.
If the trial Court recognized the Amended Complaint as a withdrawal
of the original Complaint, execution of the order dated September
16, 1992 would have been superfluous. It is clear, therefore, that
neither Teamsters nor DiPascpiale are applicable in the present
action.
For the reasons stated above, the case law Defendants have
relied upon to support their contention that Anna Lee may not
appeal the dismissal of her Complaint is not applicable to the case
at hand.

Anna Lee has every right as Plaintiff in the original

action to appeal the dismissal of her action and requests this
9

Court to recognize her right to do so and allow her to proceed with
her appeal in this matter.
B.

Even If Anna Lee Lost Her Standing As A Party By Amending
Her Complaint, She Is The Real Party In Interest And As Such
Is Entitled To Appeal The Dismissal of Her Complaints.
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that the traditional

test for standing in the district courts is twofold:
interest of the parties must be adverse; and

(1) the

(2) the parties

seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the
controversy. Jenkins v. Swanf 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). In
the present case, Anna Lee meets both of these requirements. There
can be no serious question that Anna Lee's interests are adverse to
those of Defendants. Further, it is clear that Anna Lee's interest
in the controversy is legally protectible.

As such, Anna Lee has

the right to appeal final adverse rulings of the district court and
is therefore a proper party to this appeal.
Even

if

Anna

Lee

failed

the

above-stated

standing

requirements, she would still be the proper party to bring this
appeal.

The Supreme

Court of Utah has determined

that an

individual who does not meet the traditional test of standing may
be granted standing if "there is no more appropriate appellant and
the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if the [appellant] is
denied standing."

Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d

451, 454 (Utah 1985); See, also, Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,
1150-51 (Utah 1983).
In the present case, Anna Lee is the most appropriate party
to bring this appeal.

She, alone, was the party whose Complaint
10

was dismissed at the outset of this case. Anna Lee, as beneficiary
of the Norman Anderson Trust, has been financially injured by
Defendants1 actions.

The former trustee is not an appropriate

party to appeal this action because he breached his fiduciary duty
to Anna Lee and is partly responsible for her financial injuries.
Defendants contend that David M. Dudley, the Substitute
Trustee, is the only proper party to bring this appeal. When Anna
Lee's original Complaint was dismissed, Anna Lee caused David M.
Dudley to file the Amended Complaint as the Substitute Trustee of
the Norman Anderson Trust.

There is no question that David M.

Dudley represented the interests of Anna Lee. The Court was aware
of this fact.

Defendants were aware of this fact.

It is

interesting to note that the order drafted by Defendants and
executed by the Court dismissing the Amended Complaint was styled
"Anna Lee Anderson, Plaintiff vs. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., . .
. ". See, Rec. 218 - 19. Naturally, the Amended Complaint itself
was styled "David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust,
Plaintiff,

. . ."

"Freudian"

slip

See, Rec. 92.

Perhaps this was just a

on the part of Defendants, but

it is also

indicative that everyone knew and recognized that Anna Lee was the
real party in interest.
Anna Lee is the proper party to appeal the dismissal of her
action.

She is the one person who has suffered harm from the

actions of the Defendants and has a stake in the outcome of this
case.

Finally, and perhaps most compelling, the issues at hand

will not be raised and redressed at all if Anna Lee is denied
11

standing•
1.

Non-parties may bring an appeal in certain situations.
Defendantsf contention that a non-party to an action cannot

bring an appeal is not completely accurate. According to Utah law,
once an appellant has shown that he or she meets the traditional
standing requirements, an appellant "must show that he or she was
a party or privy to the action below and that he or she is
aggrieved by the Court's judgment."

Society of Professional

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P. 2d 1166 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added)
citing Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962
(Utah 1986) . As previously set out, Anna Lee meets the traditional
standing requirements having suffered "some distinct and palpable
injury that gives [her] a personal stake in the outcome of the
legal dispute."

Bullock, 743 P.2d at 1170

Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).

quoting Jenkins v.

Assuming, arguendo, that

this Court finds that after the filing of the Amended Complaint
that Anna Lee was not a party to the action below, it should also
certainly find that Anna Lee was a privy to said action.

As used

in determining whether an individual is a proper party to appeal an
action, privy means "heirs, executors, administrators, terretenants and those having an interest in remainder or reversion, or
persons who are made parties by law."
Error § 176 (1962)(emphasis added).

4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal And

Pursuant to Bullock and Olson,

Anna Lee did not have to be a party to the action in the trial
Court in order to bring an appeal so long as she was a privy to the
action and aggrieved by the Court's ruling.
12

In light of the

foregoing, there is no question that Anna Lee was a privy to the
action and was certainly aggrieved by the Court's rulings.
Neighboring state Courts have also found that a non-party has
standing

to

appeal

"if

it

appears

that

the

appellant

was

'substantially aggrieved by the disposition of the case in the
lower court.'" Roberts-Henry v. Richter, 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo.App.
1990) citing Miller v. Clark, 144 Colo. 431, 356 P.2d 965 (1960).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Montana stated that the test to
determine

standing

to appeal

is "whether one has a direct,

immediate and substantial interest in the subject which would be
prejudiced by the judgment or benefitted by its reversal.

A non-

party has standing to appeal if he has such an interest." Montana
Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Serv. Reg., 709 P.2d 995, 1001 (Mont.
1985) citing Estate of Tomlinson, 65 111.2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109,
111 (1976).
There is absolutely no question that Anna Lee meets the
criteria cited in the cases above. Anna Lee has a direct immediate
and substantial interest in this action becuse she, as beneficary,
was harmed by Defendants' unlawful transfer of assets from the
Trust.

Further, Anna Lee will undoubtedly be prejudiced by the

order dismissing her Complaints in that the dismissals will deprive
her of obtaining relief from the injuries she has suffered. On the
other hand, Anna Lee will be greatly benefitted by this Court's
reversal of the dismissals because such reversal will allow her to
pursue the only remedy she has against Defendants.

Therefore,

under Utah law and the law of surrounding jurisdictions, Anna Lee
13

may bring this appeal, even if this Court finds that she lost her
status as a party when she amended her Complaint.
II.

ANNA LEE'S COMPLAINT COMES WITHIN AN EXCEPTION TO THE
GENERAL RULE THAT ONLY THE TRUSTEE CAN BRING THE
PRESENT ACTION.

A.

Anna Lee Pled, With Specificity, An Exception To The
General Rule That Only A Trustee May Sue On
Behalf Of The Trust.

Anna Lee pled that Defendants knowlingly participated in the
breach of fiduciary duty when they induced and obtained the
transfer of assets from the Trust account to the personal accounts
of the Trustee and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust.

She further pled

that said transfer was in violation of the Trust Agreement. In her
opening brief, Anna Lee has lead this Court through the facts and
law clearly showing that she fits within an exception to the
general rule requiring suits to be filed by trustees and not by the
beneficiaries to a trust.
B.

The Trustee's Breach Was Not Raised For The
First Time On Appeal.

Defendants1 contention that Anna Lee mentioned the trustee's
breach for the first time on appeal is inaccurate.

Anna Lee

discussed the trustee's breach in her Reply Memorandum in Support
of

Plaintiff's

Motion

to Amend

Complaint, Rec.

160

- 167;

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, Rec. 52 - 64; and during oral argument of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Frederick,

Rec.

235

-

243.

Complaint before Judge

Throughout

the

above-mentioned

pleadings, Anna lee referred to the transfer of assets as a breach
of fiduciary duty and in direct violation of the Trust Agreement.
14

Anna Lee refers specifically to the Trustee's participation in said
breach. Anna Lee states in these pleadings that the Trustee signed
the letter of instruction, prepared by Defendants, authorizing the
transfer of assets from the Trust.

She also states that such

transfer was in direct violation of the trust provisions.
It is true, however, that Anna Lee does not contend that the
Trustee knowingly breached his fiduciary duty.
that the trustee was unaware of his breach.

In fact, she claims
However, the trustee

need not knowingly breach his fiduciary duty in order for this
action to come under the exception allowing an individual to bring
suit on her own behalf as a beneficiary of the trust.
In any event, it is clear that the issue of the trustee's
breach of his fiduciary duty were brought to the Court's attention
on numerous occasions through various pleadings as well as during
the oral argument itself. Defendants' assertion that the trustee's
breach is being raised for the first time on appeal is simply
without support.
C.

The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiff's Claim.
Pursuant to § 327 of the Restatement

(Second) of Trusts

(1976) , a beneficiary may bring suit even when the Trustee is timebarred:
(2)
If
the
third
person
knowingly
participated in a breach of trust, the
beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining
an action against him therefor, unless:
(a)

The beneficary is himself guilty of
laches, or;

(b)

A co-trustee who did not particpate in
the breach of trust, or a successor
15

trustee knowing of the claim against the
third person, fails to bring an action
against him until he is barred by the
Statute of limitations or by laches.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 327 at 126.
Anna Lee is not required to plead that the Trustee knowingly
breached his fiduciary duty in order to come within the exception
provided in § 327 of the Restatement.

She need only allege that

the Defendants knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary
duty. Anna Lee pled with specificity Defendants1 knowledge of the
terms of the Trust and their knowing violation of said terms.
Defendants had the sophistication and expertise to interpret the
Trust Agreement.

In spite of their understanding of its terms,

they induced the Trustee to sign a letter transferring assets from
the Trust account to other accounts, in direct contravention of the
Trust provisions.
Pursuant to § 327 of the Restatement, even though the Trustee
may be time-barred from bringing suit against Defendants, Anna Lee,
as beneficiary of the Trust, may bring the suit as long as she is
not guilty of laches. Anna Lee brought this suit immediately upon
her discovery of the breach. Furthermore, there was no co-trustee
at the time of the breach

(other than Defendants as defacto

trustees), and the successor trustee had not even been appointed
until after Anna Lee discovered the breach and filed the instant
action.
Thus, pursuant to § 327 of the Restatement
Trusts, (1976), Anna Lee's claim is not time-barred.

(Second) of
fl

[W]here the

trustee transfers trust property in breach of Trust to a third
16

person who has actual knowledge of the breach of Trust, it is clear
that the beneficiaries will not be barred by the lapse of time
merely because the trustee is barred."
Trusts, § 327.2 at 326 (4th Ed. 1989).

IV A. Scott, The Law of
The comment to § 327(2) of

the Restatement similarly provides that the beneficiary will be
barred from bringing an action against a third party "if, but only
if, he is himself guilty of laches. Thus, the beneficiary will not
be barred if he is under an incapacity or ordinarily if he did not
know of the breach of trust."

Id. at 127-28.

In the present case, Anna Lee is not guilty of laches. Anna
Leefs complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Anna Lee did not lose her standing to appeal when she filed
her Amended Complaint.

The trial Court entered a final order on

her original Complaint on September 16, 1991 and that order is
clearly appealable. Even if this Court were to find that Anna Lee
lost her standing as a party when she amended her Complaint, under
Utah law a person privy to the action and aggrieved thereby may
appeal as well.

Anna Lee is undoubtedly a privy to the action and

aggrieved thereby and as such is entitled to bring this appeal.
The trial court erred in dismissing Anna Lee's original
Complaint. A beneficiary may bring suit against a third party who
knowingly participates in a breach of trust, even when the trustee
himself is time-barred, so long as the beneficiary is not guilty of
laches.

Anna Lee is the only proper party to bring this action.
17

Because

of

the trustee's

involvement

in

the breach,

unknowing, he should not be expected to bring suit.

albeit

Anna Lee has

a compelling interest in the outcome of this case. No other person
shares a similar interest in this action, and these issues will not
be resolved if Anna Lee is denied the right to appeal.
brought this suit immediately upon

Anna Lee

discovering the breach.

Anna

Lee is therefore not guilty of laches or barred by the statute of
limitations.
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